



On November 26, 2002, President George W. Bush signed the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, one of the centerpieces of his agenda to
revive the economy and mitigate the economic threat posed by terrorism.'
The Act was designed to address an alleged economic "crisis" caused by
the unwillingness of insurers to issue terrorism insurance except on
prohibitively expensive terms in the wake of the World Trade Center
attacks.2 The Act's proponents claimed that the unavailability of terrorism
insurance not only left physical assets exposed or underinsured against
terrorist acts, but also threatened to undermine the viability of capital
projects that depended on access to terrorism insurance to secure bank
loans.'
The Act's solution to this problem was to create a temporary federal
government reinsurance program lasting up to three years.4 This program
will fund ninety percent of the costs, above increasing annual deductibles,
1. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 101(a)-(b), 116 Stat.
2322, 2322-23 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 248, 1610, 6701 (West Supp. 2003)) (detailing the
economic objectives of the Act to overcome the effects of terrorism); Elisabeth Bumiller,
Government To Cover Most Costs of Insurance Losses in Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2002,
at AI (noting that the Act was one of the President's legislative priorities).
2. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO-02-472T, TERRORISM INSURANCE:
RISING UNINSURED EXPOSURE TO ATTACKS HEIGHTENS POTENTIAL ECONOMIC
VULNERABILITIES 3-12 (2002).
3. See JOINT ECON. COMM., 107TH CONG., ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM
INSURANCE 5-13 (Comm. Print 2002); see also $8 Billion Plus in Deals Affected by Terrorism
Insurance Issues, MORTGAGE BANKING, Sept. 2002, at 105 (claiming that the lack of
comprehensive and affordable terrorism insurance since September 11, 2001, had killed $3.7
billion of commercial property deals and delayed or changed the pricing of $4.5 billion in other
deals).
4. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act §§ 101(b), 108(a). The reinsurance plan initially covers
only property-casualty insurance, which is the focus of this Note. See id. §§ 102(12), 103(a)-(b).
The Act also mandates that the Secretary of the Treasury conduct a study concerning the potential
expansion of the reinsurance plan to cover group life insurance and authorizes the Secretary to
expand reinsurance coverage if she deems this coverage "is not or will not be reasonably
available." See id. § 103(h). The implications of potential government intervention in the group
life insurance market could be a paper in itself and will not be addressed extensively in this Note.
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that the insurance industry may face from terrorist attacks.5 The Act's
professed, if somewhat nebulous, goal was to ensure the "widespread
availability and affordability of property and casualty insurance for
terrorism risk ' 6 at "reasonable and predictable prices.",7 President Bush
spoke for many of the Act's supporters in claiming that the greater access to
terrorism insurance resulting from the Act would enable "builders and
investors [to] begin construction in real estate projects that have been
stalled for too long, and get our hard hats back to work." 8
This public-interest story9 of terrorism insurance market failure that
necessitated government intervention had resonance both with politicians
and with a public wrought with emotion after the World Trade Center
attacks and frightened by the specter of future acts of terrorism.1 ° The
federal government has a long history of offering subsidized insurance
5. See id. § 103(e).
6. See id. § 101(b)(1).
7. See id. § 101(a)(1).
8. Press Release, White House, President Signs Terrorism Insurance Act (Nov. 26, 2002), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021126-1.html, The President claimed that
at least $15 billion in construction projects had been delayed or cancelled because of higher
premiums for property and casualty insurance, terrorism exclusions in policies, or the withdrawal
of insurers from property and casualty insurance markets. Id.
9. Public-interest theorists posit that there is a public interest, distinct from private interests,
and that government regulation is generally designed to serve the public interest. See STEPHEN
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-35 (1982) (laying out public-interest rationales for
government regulation); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public
Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG., 167, 168-69 (1990);
Sidney A. Shapiro, Keeping the Baby and Throwing Out the Bathwater: Justice Breyer's Critique
of Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 721, 721 (1995). In contrast, public-choice theorists argue
that ostensibly public purposes serve as pretexts for organized interests to initiate and/or shape
government regulation in order to advance private ends through state action or inaction. See
generally Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Fred S. McChesney,
Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101
(1987); Samuel Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211
(1976); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGERIAL
Sci. 335 (1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MANAGERIAL SCI. 3 (1971). This Note seeks to further efforts to integrate lessons from both
public-interest and public-choice views into coherent ways of designing public institutions that
contain safeguards to limit rent-seeking and public capture. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Cass R.
Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7-10 (1995) (laying out a set of
procedural and substantive reforms designed to further the Clinton Administration's attempt to
"reinvent government" and enhance the regulatory processes and outcomes); Cass R. Sunstein,
Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 407-08 (1990) (seeking to learn from
past failures and the omnipresence of paradoxes of the regulatory state to forge more effective
public institutions).
10. The House approved the Act by a majority of 227 to 193 and affirmed the subsequent
conference report by a voice vote, which reflected a high level of consensus for the final product.
See 148 CONG. REc. H8802-09 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2002), 2002 WL 31537314. The Senate
approved the Act by an overwhelming majority of 85 to 12. See 148 CONG. REC. S 11,524-25
(daily ed. Nov. 19, 2002), 2002 WL 31600115; see also Adam Clymer & Janet Elder, Poll Finds
Unease on Terror Fight and Concerns About War on Iraq, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept, 8, 2002, at Al
(noting that American public opinion suggested widespread doubt that the federal government had
done enough to address potential terrorist attacks).
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programs, such as flood insurance, that are rife with moral hazards and have
often served no one's interests save the insured beneficiaries. 1 In spite of
this fact, the market failure story for terrorism insurance has some
economic credence.' 2 Insurers face difficulties in estimating both the
probability of terrorist attacks and their likely magnitude.' 3 Following the
World Trade Center attacks, perceptions of the probability of terrorism
risks increased dramatically,' 4 and the short-term capacity of terrorism
insurance declined significantly.15 Yet a year after the September 11, 2001
attacks, and before the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act's passage, terrorism
insurance had once again become readily available for those facing small
and medium risks of terrorism. Insurance premiums had begun to decrease
gradually from high levels following the World Trade Center attacks.'
6
Nonetheless, high-risk property owners and developers of infrastructure
or expensive properties in large cities, such as Chicago, New York City,
and Washington, D.C., often could still not acquire terrorism insurance
policies at any price. 7 These high-risk parties combined with insurers to
argue that government intervention was needed to overcome an alleged
market failure in order to safeguard both the economy and homeland
security.
18
Public justifications of the Act based on the market failure story
covered an equally important subtext: rent-seeking by insurers, individuals,
11. See George L. Priest, The Government, the Market, and the Problem of Catastrophic
Loss, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 219, 225-35 (1996) (identifying many of the problems that have
plagued past programs of government-subsidized insurance against catastrophic losses).
12. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509,
536-50 (1986) (discussing the general advantages of market over government insurance provision,
but arguing that "[g]ovemment mitigation would, however, be appropriate if designed to alleviate
imperfections that prevent markets from efficiently addressing risks and incentives").
13. See Moody's Investors Serv., CMBS: Moody's Approach to Terrorism Insurance for U.S.
Commercial Real Estate 3 (Mar. 1, 2002), at http://www.narcit.com/govemmentrelations/
moodys.pdf.
14. Changed risk perceptions both among the general public and the insurance industry in the
wake of the World Trade Center attacks highlight the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein recently
termed "probability neglect." "[W]hen intense emotions are engaged, people tend to focus on the
adverse outcome, not on its likelihood," which may lead to significant distortions in both private
behavior and public policy. Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and
Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 62-63 (2002).
15. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 2.
16. See Lisa S. Howard, Capacity Issues Creep into Specialty Terror Market, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, May 6, 2002, at 20 (noting that in the seven months since September 11, 2001,
"the market has stabilized, more capacity has become available, and prices have dropped");
CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., How THE LACK OF FEDERAL BACK UP FOR TERRORISM INSURANCE
HAS AFFECTED INSURERS AND CONSUMERS: AN UPDATE 5-11 (2002), at
http://www.consumerfed.org/terror insurance report.pdf.
17. See CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., supra note 16, at 5.
18. See, e.g., Press Release, Coalition To Insure Against Terrorism, CIAT Welcomes
President's Call for Senate Action on Terror Insurance (Apr. 8, 2002), at
http://www.insureagainstterrorism.org/news 040802.html (quoting a spokesman who argued the
Act "is about jobs, economic security and homeland security").
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and corporations that face high risks from terrorism attacks.' 9 These parties
functioned as political entrepreneurs who successfully advocated the federal
government's assumption of much of the economic risks posed by the
threat of terrorist attacks. 20 Few politicians in an election year could resist
jumping on the bandwagon of terrorism insurance intervention. This issue
allowed politicians to demonstrate to the general public that they were
addressing economic and homeland security issues, while simultaneously
providing rents for their supporters. 1
Insuring against terror may pose new challenges for both insurers and
insured, but successful rent-seeking is an all-too-familiar tale in American
public policymaking. What distinguishes the terrorism insurance market is
not the government's decision to intervene, but the reinsurance approach
that the government adopted, which provides an innovative means of
limiting the effects of the rents.22 The strength of special-interest pressure
made upwards redistribution almost inevitable in any government
"solution." Nonetheless, this Note will demonstrate how the reinsurance
19. Rent-seeking is generally used to describe expenditures by both producer and consumer
interests designed to seek "rents" or redistribution of wealth from legislative or administrative
bodies. James Buchanan, Robert Tollison, and Gordon Tullock define rent-seeking as "the
resource-wasting activities of individuals in seeking transfers of wealth through the aegis of the
state." See James M. Buchanan et al., Preface to TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING
SOCIETY, at ix, ix (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980). Cass Sunstein defines rent-seeking as
"the dissipation of wealth through efforts to redistribute resources by way of politics." CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 70
(1990). Richard Posner frames rent-seeking as the attempt to gain a supranormal profit (a rent)
without producing additional outputs. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 9-11,
37 n.3 (4th ed. 1992). For a different view of rent-seeking, see Mark Kelman, On Democracy-
Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice
Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 230-38 (1988) (arguing for the democratic nature and benefits of
rent-seeking behavior, and criticizing the public-choice movement).
20. This rent-seeking story was below the radar screen of public debate, which focused on the
alleged economic impact of terrorism insurance availability and sympathetic "poster children" of
unemployed construction workers and landmarks that lacked insurance. See, e.g., Press Release,
supra note 8.
21. See Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market
Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 51-52 (1988) (framing legislators as political entrepreneurs
who actively seek to embrace and control issues that will maximize their electoral support while
allowing them to supply rents to organized interests).
22. The U.S. reinsurance system does bear some resemblance to the British Pool Reinsurance
system (Pool Re), which was formed as a response to Irish Republican Army attacks in London.
The British Pool Re is a mutual reinsurance company that incorporates a national government
backstop for terrorist acts. Participation is optional for all insurers. If an insurer chooses to
participate in Pool Re, all of its property policies must be reinsured through Pool Re, which
charges rates based on the insured property's value, its urban or rural location, and estimates of
the individual properties' exposure. The reinsurance pool is funded by these charges and a three
percent government levy on all property insurance in the United Kingdom. In the event of a
terrorist attack the insurer is liable for the first £100,000, then all insurers are subject to a ten
percent call on their annual contribution to the pool if the pool is exhausted, and after that point
the remaining losses are fully covered by the British government. See William B. Bice, Comment,
British Government Reinsurance and Acts of Terrorism: The Problems of Pool Re, 15 U. PA. J.
INT'L BUS. L. 441, 448-54 (1994). As Part III will highlight, the U.S. reinsurance plan differs in
significant respects.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2512 [Vol. 112: 2509
Insuring Against Terror?
approach is an innovation over past direct government insurance plans
because of its incorporation of safeguards to limit the degree of rent-
seeking and the distorting effects of government intervention.
A number of legal scholars have highlighted insurers' use of terrorism
exclusions in policies issued after the World Trade Center attacks in order
to avoid liability exposure.23 The legal literature, however, has thus far
largely overlooked the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act.2 4 Law-and-economics
scholars have repeatedly made arguments against government interventions
in insurance markets, relying on solid empirical examples of the distorting
effects of past government interventions.25 A few law-and-economics
scholars have applied these largely valid economic critiques of government
intervention to terrorism insurance.26 This Note argues that the economic
case for government intervention is stronger than these critics have
acknowledged, yet shows how rent-seeking drove intervention. This Note
concludes that the lasting legacy of the Act is the indirect intervention that
the reinsurance plan entails.
This reinsurance approach satisfies the overwhelming rent-seeking
pressures, yet limits the distorting effects of intervention on private
markets. The plan still contains loopholes for further rent-seeking that
policymakers should seek to narrow, especially if this "temporary" program
becomes effectively permanent. The use of deductibles and copayments,
23. See, e.g., Steven Plitt, The Changing Face of Global Terrorism and a New Look of War:
An Analysis of the War-Risk Exclusion in the Wake of the Anniversary of September 11, and
Beyond, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 31 (2003); Gene Rappe, The Role of Insurance in the Battle
Against Terrorism, 12 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 351, 363-77 (2000) (arguing how existing policy
exclusions prior to September 11 th could be used to mitigate losses that insurers will face from
future terrorist attacks); Jane Kendall, Comment, The Incalculable Risk: How the World Trade
Center Disaster Accelerated the Evolution of Insurance Terrorism Exclusions, 36 U. RICH. L.
REV, 569 (2002) (highlighting the range of policy exclusions that have developed after the World
Trade Center attacks); Annemarie Sedore, Note, War Risk Exclusions in the 21st Century:
Applying War Risk Exclusions to the Attacks of September 11th, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1041 (2002)
(discussing why insurers chose not to attempt to exercise war exclusion claims for the September
I Ith attacks and why and how they would seek to use these exclusions to mitigate future losses).
24. This Note only reflects legal developments concerning the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
and the academic literature as of April 1, 2003.
25. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Catastrophic Responses to Catastrophic Risks, 12 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 287 (1996). See generally Priest, supra note 1 I.
26. See ANNE GRON & ALAN 0. SYKES, TERRORISM AND INSURANCE MARKETS: A ROLE
FOR THE GOVERNMENT AS INSURER? (Univ. of Chi., Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 155 (2d
ser.), 2002), at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html (criticizing the long-term
distorting effects of terrorism insurance); Saul Levmore & Kyle Logue, Insuring Against
Terrorism-and Crime (Feb. 6, 2003), at http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/
olin/workshops.htm (critiquing how federal government responses to the September 1 th attacks,
such as the reinsurance plan and the September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund, may affect
private expectations concerning government responses to future terrorist attacks, and assessing the
implications of terrorism insurance for the possibility of broader government insurance against
crime). But see Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Federal Terrorism Risk Insurance, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 647,
653-54 (2002) (praising the time-limited nature of the then-pending legislation and the presence of
provisions to limit the crowding out effect on private insurers).
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however, may serve as a model for federal insurance intervention that
provides private insurers with incentives to limit the moral hazards and
other rent-seeking abuses that have historically plagued direct government
insurance programs.
27
Part II will show that there may be special justifications for intervention
in the terrorism insurance market, but that rent-seeking interest groups
overemphasized the "crisis" affecting terrorism insurance. This Part will
analyze the special economic challenges that insurers face in estimating the
probability of terrorist attacks and having the liquidity to cover the costs of
catastrophic terrorist attacks. It will consider the theoretical case for the
government's assumption of at least part of the terrorism risk. This Part will
also assess the extent to which both private insurers and other affected
parties successfully adapted to higher perceived terrorism risk in the year
between the World Trade Center attacks and the Terrorism Risk Insurance
Act's passage. While the economic case for intervention has some
credence, this Part will show how politics drove government intervention.
Part II will highlight how insurers and high-risk property owners
successfully constructed terrorism insurance as a public rather than as an
exclusively private problem to provide cover for their rent-seeking agenda.
The linkage of terrorism insurance with the economic downturn and
homeland security provided politicians with the perfect opportunity to
address pressing issues and also award rents to special interests.
Part III will show that in spite of the Act's genesis in rent-seeking, the
design of the government reinsurance plan represents significant progress
compared to direct, subsidized insurance. This innovative approach
incorporates the almost inevitable upwards redistribution that subsidized
government insurance entails and advances special interests far more than
the general interest. 28 Nonetheless, the plan's employment of market pricing
by insurers limits rent-seeking. The use of copayments and deductibles
reduces moral hazards and limits the degree of risk shifting to the federal
government. The Note concludes that the plan's pragmatic attempt to
balance overwhelming rent-seeking pressures with economic safeguards
may form a model for containing the rent-seeking and distorting effects of
government intervention in a world of policymaking characterized more by
political failures than by market failures.
27. See Kaplow, supra note 12, at 537-44 (discussing the fact that government insurance
provision generally fails to remedy, and often exacerbates, moral hazards).
28. See Levine & Forrence, supra note 9, at 174-77 (describing general interest policies as
those that would likely have secured the support of a majority of citizens if their information,
organization, and transaction costs were zero, and contrasting this useful standard to the elusive
ideal of the public interest).
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1I. THE CASE FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
A. The Economic Challenges Facing Terrorism Insurance
1. How Pure Insurance Markets Work
Before beginning a discussion of the special economic challenges posed
by terrorism insurance, it is necessary to establish clearly what insurance is
designed to do. This, in turn, may help to elucidate when market failures
may be taking place. Insurance covers risks that are not preventable for a
lower cost than the expected loss. For example, no amount of preventive
measures can fully eliminate the probability of property damage from
natural catastrophes. Pure insurance provision allows individuals to pay the
expected value of their loss plus a premium for transaction costs up-front to
limit the economic consequences of a given risk's occurrence. 9 Insurers
eliminate the disutility of risk by pooling a given insured's risk with other
risks with which it is not correlated and transforming risks individuals face
into almost certain costs.
3 0
Insurers use measurement costs and transaction costs to calculate
insurance premiums.' Measurement costs are the product of the estimated
probability of an insured risk's occurrence and the economic cost of loss if
the insured risk occurs.32 Measurement costs form the primary basis for
calculating insurance premiums, and their precision rests on the accuracy of
the underlying information. Insurers also charge additional fees for
transaction costs incurred in insurers' administration of the policies, as well
as additional margins for profit.
33
The classic case of pure insurance is life insurance. 34 No company
knows when a given individual is going to die, but actuarial tables can
indicate with great precision that a person of X age and in good health has a
Y percentage chance of dying. The insurance premium for a life insurance
policy of Z dollars on such a person is then simply the product of Z dollars
with the Y percentage chance of death, plus transaction costs. 35 This
transaction offers literally no risks for the insurer, so long as the pool of
insured individuals is adequately large and the information gathered on the
individuals insured is accurate. The only reason a life insurance company
29. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521, 1539 (1987).
30. See id. at 1540.
31. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 103-05.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See Douglas A. Kahn & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Tax Consequences of Assigning Life
Insurance-Timefor Another Look, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 381, 384-85 (1999).
35. See id.
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would secure reinsurance under these circumstances would be to ensure
liquidity in case a large number of deaths or premature withdrawals of
funds occur in a short period of time.36
2. How Terrorism Insurance Differs from Insurance for
Natural Catastrophes
Terrorism insurance differs from pure insurance in two important
respects that raise the possibility of lasting market failure. First, terrorism
insurers suffer from a significant lack of available information to make
determinations on the probability of terrorist events and, to a lesser extent,
face difficulties in estimating the potential magnitude of terrorist attacks. If
insurance companies significantly underestimate the risk probabilities and
the potential magnitude of terrorist attacks, they may be exposed to risks
well above revenues from insurance premiums. Insurers may also suffer
from a lack of liquidity that may arise from the occurrence of large-scale
terrorist attacks and may need to purchase reinsurance to guard against this
possibility.
Many, if not most, insurance calculations necessarily entail a degree of
misestimation risk because of the limits on the availability and accuracy of
information. Insurers can calculate the statistical probability of a man's
death with great precision.37 In contrast, other risks such as the probability
of a flood, hurricane, or earthquake are (in ascending order) far more
difficult to predict and analogous to acts of terrorism in the scale of
damages that they can cause. These misestimation risks are not
diversifiable, and insurers must charge additional premiums to increase the
amount of capital they are holding to cover these additional risks.38
The question of the potential for market failure is whether there is a
difference in degree or in kind from the misestimation risks facing
insurance estimates for natural catastrophes, such that terrorism risks
"require" a government solution. 39 Both natural and terrorist catastrophes
share three basic features: They occur infrequently and unpredictably, yet
they can impose huge costs when they do occur.40
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See Scott E. Harrington, Rethinking Disaster Policy, 23 REGULATION 40, 42 (2000).
39. The federal government has not been constrained by this approach. Political pressures
have led to government insurance for any number of much more foreseeable catastrophes, such as
flooding on the Mississippi River. See, e.g., Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No.
93-234, 87 Stat. 975 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); National Flood
Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
40. See Weimin Dong et a]., A Rational Approach to Pricing of Catastrophe Insurance, 12 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 201, 201 (1996).
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In spite of the basic similarity, insurers may face significantly greater
challenges in anticipating the risks of terrorist attacks than natural
catastrophes. Unlike natural catastrophes, there are currently so few data
points on the occurrence of terrorism that it is extremely difficult to
calculate probabilities of a risk's occurrence and its magnitude.4' If terrorist
events begin to occur with greater frequency, then over time it is
conceivable that companies will be able to predict the probability of
terrorist events with more accuracy. 42 Nonetheless, the current lack of data
for estimating risks may point to the potential desirability of a "short term"
reduction of risk through government intervention.
The risk of natural catastrophes cannot be anticipated in an actuarial
sense, 43 but terrorist attacks lack even the relative degree of predictability
that many natural catastrophic events share. Terrorists often purposefully
avoid attacking in patterns in order to minimize the possibility of capture
and presumably to maximize terror." In contrast, natural catastrophes
generally follow proximate patterns, even though the incidence of a given
natural event incorporates a significant degree of randomness in its timing
and location (hence, the need for insurance). For example, earthquakes
track fault lines, and hurricanes generally affect the same parts of the Gulf
of Mexico or the South Atlantic Coast. Even the "Big One" earthquake,
which may have devastating economic consequences, is a geographically
limited threat to the West Coast and is unlikely to affect Peoria, Illinois or
Nashville, Tennessee. One can argue that terrorist attacks may follow the
same patterns over time of only threatening urban centers or infrastructure
targets. As the Oklahoma City bombing and the Unabomber remind us,
however, the number of potential terrorist targets may be far larger than
areas exposed to a given type of natural catastrophe.
Insurers can estimate with some precision the scope of threats posed by
natural catastrophes through tools such as hazard-risk maps and historical
estimates of the probability of an event's occurrence and levels of
compensation likely to result.45 These probabilistic tools have limits, as the
high uncertainty of the timing of the "Big One" earthquake in California
suggests. The accuracy of the information detailing the probability and
magnitude of this mega-event is doubtful. This type of catastrophic event
41. See Moody's Investors Serv., supra note 13, at 3.
42. See, e.g., Gordon Woo, Quantifying Insurance Terrorism Risk 11-16 (Feb. 1, 2002), at
http://www.nber.org/-,confer/2OO2/inswO2/woo.pdf (suggesting how it may be possible to use data
points of terrorist attacks and near misses to parametrize loss-severity distributions and to make
estimates of the annual loss-exceedance probability, yet acknowledging the need for the extensive
use of subjective risk-probability estimations).
43. See Dong et al., supra note 40, at 201.
44. See Moody's Investors Serv., supra note 13, at 3.
45. Sophisticated insurance industry software programs can incorporate these data into
probabilities for a given locality and structure that is being insured. See, e.g., CDS Bus. Mapping,
Risk Maps, at http://www.cdsys.com/risk-maps.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
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may pose similar difficulties for probability estimations and insurer
liquidity as large-scale terrorist attacks.46
Some insurance models have been introduced for terrorism insurance
that claim to incorporate probabilities and potential severities for a full
range of terrorist attacks.47 The efficacy of these models is dubious,
however, for the reasons mentioned above. The sparse number of actual and
attempted terrorist attacks in the United States provides few data points for
models to consider.
Insurers can determine risks on a relative basis by imposing higher
premiums for prominent landmarks and for urban over suburban or for
suburban over rural properties.48 Insurers may also begin to demand
additional information on the concentration of employees, building
locations, security precautions, and catastrophe plans to begin making case-
by-case determinations of risk exposure. But insurers currently lack the
tools to determine what the baseline of the probabilistic risk of terrorist
attacks should be. For this reason, the potential for misestimation for
terrorism insurance may expose insurers to higher risks than other forms of
insurance.
3. The Potential Liquidity Problems in the Case of
Full-Scale Catastrophes
Another compelling argument for intervention is the liquidity concern
facing the insurance and reinsurance industry in the event of future
catastrophic terrorist attacks.49 Only the federal government has the deep
(and theoretically unlimited) pockets through its taxing powers to endure
the financial shocks of the most severe catastrophic events.50 This is one of
46. Only seventeen percent of Californians have earthquake insurance. This figure is down
from twenty-eight percent before the Northridge earthquake in 1994, primarily because of the
very high premiums. See Vicki Lankarge, The Big One Will Devastate Californians' Financial
Foundation (June 19, 2002), at http://www.insure.com/states/ca/home/quakefmances.html. The
fact that government reinsurance for terrorism insurance has been enacted, while government
provision for earthquake insurance has not, even when the implications of both have some similar
characteristics, suggests the importance of organized interest groups in setting political agendas.
See infra Section II.C.
47. See, e.g., Ara C. Trembly, Terrorism Modeling Grows for Insurers in Posi-9/11 Era,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Oct. 14, 2002, at 12 (describing four different terrorism risk-estimation
models that employ game theory to estimate risk exposure); Press Release, AIR Worldwide Corp.,
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act Poses New Underwriting Challenges for Insurers (Nov. 21, 2002),
at http://www.insurance-portal.com/1 12202.htm (discussing the AIR Fully Probabilistic
Terrorism Loss Estimation Model).
48. See Moody's Investors Serv., supra note 13, at 6-7.
49. See, e.g., JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 3, at 1-5; AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES,
TERRORISM INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE AFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER 11TH, at 2-5 (2002);
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 3-7.
50. Warren Buffett, head of Berkshire Hathaway and its subsidiary General Reinsurance,
summarized the conventional wisdom of insurance industry participants:
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the historic rationales for war and nuclear exclusions. Otherwise, a single
nuclear warhead hitting New York City could easily destroy the liquidity
and viability of the insurance industry. This fact creates a substantial moral
hazard if people widely assume that the federal government will offer
assistance in response to a catastrophic event because of liquidity concerns
for insurers and incentives to intervene for reelection-seeking politicians.
Individuals at risk may then have little incentive to buy insurance in the
first place or may take fewer precautions against damage from attacks.
In the case of the attacks on the World Trade Center, this faith was
partly vindicated through the $20 billion the federal government granted to
New York City.51 In this case, insurers had the liquidity to meet their
obligations of $30 to $40 billion dollars (or $19.5 to $26 billion after taking
into account the thirty-five percent federal tax write-offs)." The multi-
million dollar settlements awarded to all victims, many of whom had large
life insurance policies and who were disproportionately affluent, suggest
that reelection-seeking politicians will bend over backward to intervene in
high-profile catastrophes.53
To the extent that insurance premiums reflect popular assumptions of
ex post government intervention, then ex ante government intervention may
have little effect beyond increasing the overall subsidies to insured parties.
This effect may be partly offset by a decreased probability of state
compensation in the event of low-scale attacks, which may encourage more
people to buy policies. Nonetheless, as Part III will discuss, fixing the
timing and nature of government intervention may place some limits on
rents for insurers (and the insured). It may partly reduce post-catastrophe
rent-seeking (at least in the context of small-scale attacks) by allowing
politicians and opponents to point to the framework for compensation under
the reinsurance plan.54
Terrorist attacks may raise significant liquidity issues, but it is
important to emphasize that they do not appear necessarily different from
those posed by natural catastrophes. Events over the past decade
Under a "close-to-worst-case" scenario, which could conceivably involve $1 trillion ofdamage, the insurance industry would be destroyed unless it manages in some manner
to dramatically limit its assumption of terrorism risks. Only the U.S. Government has
the resources to absorb such a blow. If it is unwilling to do so on a prospective basis,
the general citizenry must bear its own risks and count on the Government to come to
its rescue after a disaster occurs.
Stephanie K. Jones, Terrorism Insurance and Home Security, INS. J. (Apr. 15, 2002), athttp://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/west/2002/04/1 5/partingshots/1 8881.htm.
51. See Carl Hulse, Congress at Ground Zero: The Special Assembly, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,
2002, at B 1.
52. CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., supra note 16, at 4.
53. Cf Peter H. Schuck, Equity for All Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2001, at A35(highlighting the disconnect between generous federal compensation for victims of the World
Trade Center attacks and the government's lack of compensation for victims of other torts).
54. See infra Subsection III.B.4.
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highlighted how natural catastrophes may pose equally significant threats to
the liquidity of insurers and reinsurers. The combined $40.2 billion in
devastation inflicted by Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the Northridge
earthquake in 1994 approximated the cost to insurers and reinsurers of the
World Trade Center attacks.5 Both of these events served as a chilling
reminder that property-casualty insurers must anticipate insurance claims of
upwards of $50 to $100 billion from even a single natural disaster, let alone
a terrorist threat.5 6 The threat of the "Big One" earthquake in California
dramatizes the point that natural catastrophes may pose liquidity threats
equal to those posed by terrorist threats, and that the insurance industry may
be totally unprepared to handle either type of truly catastrophic event.
Terrorism risks may raise distinctive challenges in accurately predicting
risks, although the predictability challenges posed by the "Big One" may
somewhat undercut this claim. Nonetheless, the significant dangers of
misestimation of terrorism risks and the liquidity risks in the case of
catastrophic attacks suggest a plausible story of at least the potential for
market failure. In theory, these concerns alone might be sufficient to justify
some form of government intervention at least in the short term. In spite of
this fact, as Part III will suggest, the potential distorting effects of
government intervention would likely militate against intervention on
economic grounds alone.
4. The Economic Case for Government Intervention
To Reduce Terrorism Risks
An additional economic justification for intervention is that the
government's assumption of at least some degree of terrorism risk facing
private parties may be both efficient and desirable. The close interplay
between the federal government's foreign policy decisions and the
existence of terrorist threats suggests that the federal government may be at
least partly responsible for "creating" many of the risks posed by terrorism.
The federal government may also be in a better position than private
55. See Reinsurance Ass'n of Am., The Reinsurance Market: The Impact of the September
1 1th Terrorism Catastrophe (Apr. 24, 2002), at http://www.raanet.org/policyupdate/terrorism/
terrorism qa.pdf; see also STANDARD & POOR'S, GLOBAL REINSURANCE HIGHLIGHTS 2002:
GEARING UP FOR 2003, at 8 (2002), at http://www.standardandpoors.com/europe/deutsch/content/
resourcecenter/pdf/02l lGlobalReinsuranceHighlights2002.pdf (noting the best estimates are that
the reinsurance industry will face $31 billion in claims from the World Trade Center attacks).
56. In contrast, catastrophic losses totaled a mere $34.6 billion for the entire period between
1949 and 1991. Kenneth A. Froot & Paul G.J. O'Connell, The Pricing of U.S. Catastrophe
Reinsurance, in THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE RISK 195, 195 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1999);
see also Kenneth A. Froot, introduction to THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE RISK, supra, at 1.
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insurers to mitigate or prevent risks of terrorism, 57 and, therefore, it may be
more efficient for the government to internalize these costs.
One of the federal government's current priorities is homeland security.
The federal government's intelligence and enforcement network may place
the government in a better position than private insurers to estimate the
probability of terrorist attacks and to act to reduce their probability of
realization and impact through preemptive enforcement actions. The federal
government is spending billions of dollars accumulating counterterrorist
information that it may not be able to disclose to private insurers because of
national security concerns.58 At least in theory, a government agency could
use this information to make more accurate risk estimates than its private
counterparts. Greater risk sharing between the government and private
insurers could also increase incentives for the government to disclose more
counterterrorist information to insurers. Regardless of this point, the
experience of private insurers in estimating risks in other areas and the
insulation of private insurers from rent-seeking may offset any government
information advantage, as Section III.C will argue. The federal
government's monopoly in setting American foreign policy, however, vests
it with both the power to address terrorist threats and, arguably, a
responsibility to address the costs of terrorist attacks that may be by-
products of foreign policy decisions.
The rationale that the federal government should internalize the costs
from terrorist attacks that its foreign policies may have helped to provoke
has remained unspoken amidst debates on terrorism insurance. This is
understandable, for politicians would be very unwise to raise this argument
during a time of war. America's close relationship with Israel, defense of its
interests in the Middle East, and active engagement in other parts of the
world may be completely justified. Nonetheless, U.S. foreign policy
decisions have aroused the ire of terrorist groups. International relations
scholars may attempt to explain away terrorism based on factors relating to
poverty, religious fundamentalism, alienation, social backwardness, or any
other number of causes. 59 The most immediate spark for terrorist attacks
57. Americans, especially political leaders, tend to regard terrorism as unprovoked actions
that have no correlation with American policies. See, e.g., L. Paul Bremer, III, A New Strategy for
the New Face of Terrorism, NAT'L INT., Thanksgiving 2001, at 23, 24-25 (arguing that "[n]othing
America can say or do, short of ceasing to exist, will satisfy these terrorists"). No one can ever
truly attempt to justify recourse to terrorism, but terrorists frequently justify their actions as
responses to U.S. foreign policies, especially in the Middle East.
58. The federal government budgeted $40 billion for counterterrorism efforts for 2002 alone.
See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Germ Defense Said To Cost Nearly Twice Bush Proposal, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2001, at B8. This sum likely produces classified terrorist risk information that dwarfs
terrorism risk information that private insurers can legally acquire at any price.
59. See, e.g., Adam Garfinkle, The Impossible Imperative? Conjuring Arab Democracy,
NAT'L INT., Fall 2002, at 156 (arguing that poverty and disinformation in the Arab world form the
foundations for terrorism).
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against the United States, however, is likely to be a combination of
America's global political and economic predominance and particular
foreign policy decisions.
At the same time, the private sector often benefits from the federal
government's domestic and foreign policies. As a result, one could argue
that private parties should accept the bitter with the sweet. They should
therefore assume these terrorism risks as the price for the benefits of living
and operating within the United States, regardless of whether the threats are
by-products of American foreign policy decisions.
It is also doubtful whether the internalization of the costs of risks
created by terrorism would have any appreciable effect on foreign or
domestic policies. The self-interest of politicians in reelection already
provides sufficient incentive for them to appear attentive to homeland
security issues, especially when our nation is absorbed with the threat of
terrorism. Politicians are also much more likely to respond to powerful
special-interest groups on foreign policies and may be indifferent as to
whether the federal government absorbs these costs. Nonetheless, the role
of U.S. foreign policy decisions in provoking terrorism and the federal
government's powers to detect and prevent terrorist acts may make
allocation of risk to the government more efficient than allocating it to
affected private parties.
B. The Potential for a "Free Market" Solution60
A limited theoretical case exists for government intervention to mitigate
the effects of the special challenges posed by terrorism insurance and to
offset the role that foreign policy decisions play in provoking terrorist
attacks. This Section will move from the theoretical case for intervention to
examine the economic viability of the terrorism insurance market during the
year between the World Trade Center attacks and the enactment of the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act. The economic story told by the Act's
proponents was one of paralysis facing insurers, businesses, and other
property owners without government intervention on terrorism insurance, a
theme that Section [I.C will discuss in depth. This alleged insurance "crisis"
had little substance in reality, yet served as a successful rent-seeking tactic
to gain the support of politicians and the general public.
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1. The Short-Term Capacity Crisis
Much of the alleged crisis was attributable to short-term capacity
shortages caused in part by insurers' perceived overexposure to risks that
preceded, yet were accentuated by, the World Trade Center attacks. 6' The
year-long lag time between the World Trade Center attacks on September
11, 2001, and the enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act on
November 26, 2002, provided time to test the potential of market forces to
address the challenges of terrorism insurance on their own.
62
The lower capacity in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks
was far from unprecedented and mirrored the pattern insurers followed after
the almost $45 billion in combined damages from Hurricane Andrew and
the Northridge earthquake in 1992 and 1994, respectively. In the short term,
insurers and reinsurers decreased capacity at the very time demand
increased because of greater perceived needs for protection due to their
desire to preserve their liquidity. The World Trade Center attacks radically
changed the risk perceptions of insurers. Their terrorism risk probability
calculations and premium prices reflected these new concerns. Premium
increases-to the extent that terrorism insurance itself was available in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11-doubled or even quadrupled.63 As insurers
recovered from these setbacks and perceptions of risk decreased, both
insurance capacity increased and premiums for property and casualty
insurance moderately decreased.64
2. The Narrowing of the "Crisis " to a Problem Mainly Facing
Those with High Risks
In the immediate aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks, a
plausible economic case existed for short-term government subsidies to
temper widespread dislocation costs. These expenditures could have
functioned as Keynesian stabilizers to smooth out the effects of the terrorist
attacks and the economic downturn. 65 A reduced appetite for risk by
insurers had led to the widespread introduction of terrorism exclusions and
61. See GRON & SYKES, supra note 26, at 2-3, 7-13 (reviewing factors that led to past
insurance "crises").
62. A partisan battle over tort reform and the inclusion of reinsurance coverage for punitive
damages held up enactment of the Act for almost a full year, which provided the opportunity to
see how market forces would address the challenges of terrorism insurance. See Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 107, 116 Stat. 2322, 2335 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 248, 1610, 6701 (West Supp. 2003)) (noting the exclusion of punitive damages from the
government's reinsurance coverage).
63. Moody's Investors Serv., supra note 13, at 4.
64. CONSUMER FED'N OF AM.,supra note 16, at 5-10.
65. See GEN. AcCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 3-7.
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limited coverage availability. 66 This problem was magnified by the
reluctance of reinsurers to continue to offer reinsurance because of the
greater risks, coupled with the expiration of seventy percent of reinsurance
treaties on January 1, 2002.67
Since bank loans generally require full insurance protection, this
situation created economic dislocation in the short term and posed a
dilemma for a wide range of construction companies, building owners, and
corporations. Building projects that were planned with the risk assumptions
prior to September 11, 2001 became less economically attractive and
potentially not viable because of new perceptions of risk from terrorist
attacks.68 In the short term, this dislocation undoubtedly resulted in
cancelled projects and fewer construction jobs,69 although the concurrent
economic downturn may have played an even larger role in these outcomes.
In the long term, changed risk perceptions may shift the focus of
construction away from high-risk areas, although in some cases this
investment shift may be a politically unviable option as the following
Section will highlight.
Government intervention to temper the effects of this type of short-term
dislocation might have made some economic sense and served as a form of
Keynesian stabilizer to help smooth out the effects of recession. 70 In the
year between the attacks and the Act, however, the availability of insurance
increased, and the behavior of affected actors began to change to
accommodate the new circumstances during the interim.7'
For example, bank lenders began to adapt to more limited access to
terrorism insurance by waiving these provisions in exchange for higher loan
rates to offset greater risks assumed by the bank.72 It is also likely
developers began to change plans to reflect the changed risks and to build
in new locations or at lower heights within high-risk locations, although this
point is more difficult to prove. During the year between the attacks and the
66. See id. at 5 (noting that terrorism insurance exclusions allowing insurers to offer property-
casualty insurance without terrorism coverage had been approved by forty-five state insurance
commissioners between September 11, 2001 and February 2002).
67. Moody's Investors Serv., supra note 13, at 4.
68. See, e.g., $8 Billion Plus in Deals Affected by Terrorism Insurance Issues, supra note 3,
at 105.
69. Notwithstanding this fact, estimates of $15 billion in cancelled construction projects and
the laying off of over 300,000 building professionals may be more a product of an economic
downturn than the product of a lack of terrorism insurance. See Press Release, supra note 8.
70. Further intervention on this front may have been unnecessary as unemployed workers
already received unemployment assistance and tax write-offs for the costs of cancelled projects.
Both serve as forms of Keynesian automatic stabilizers. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE
GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 27-34 (1st ed. 1964) (setting forth
the basic framework for the Keynesian theory of economics).
71. CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., supra note 16, at 5-10.
72. See Daniel Hays, Bankers End Up Plugging Terrorism Insurance Gap, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, Feb. 18, 2002, at 5; see also GRON & SYKES, supra note 26, at 3-4 (correctly
anticipating this development).
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enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, terrorism insurance
availability increased and prices substantially decreased for those with
small and moderate terrorism insurance risks. 73 Terrorism insurance
premiums remained substantially higher than before the World Trade
Center attacks. The high prices and the prospect of government relief may
have depressed the number and extent of policies purchased by those with
small and medium risks. The bottom line was that those facing small or
moderate terrorism risks, however, once again largely enjoyed access to
terrorism insurance.
74
After the short-term capacity shortage slowly ended, only a narrow pool
of high-risk parties confronted a "crisis" of terrorism insurance
availability. 75 This group included owners of prominent properties in major
cities, primarily Chicago, New York City, and Washington, D.C.,76 and
others with infrastructure or other properties that were perceived as high-
risk targets. Owners of trophy buildings in high-profile locations and
buildings of more than fifty stories faced severe difficulties in acquiring any
terrorism insurance at all, or above minimal coverage of seventy-five to one
hundred million dollars.77
The economically efficient outcome would be for these high-risk
parties to pay higher premiums to banks for loans and to fully internalize
these risks if they cannot acquire terrorism insurance. The long-term effect
of changed perceptions of risks may be to create greater incentives for new
buildings to be located in different places such as suburbs, rather than cities,
or to be built at lower heights in cities to reduce terrorism risk exposure.
Existing skyscrapers without terrorism insurance may pose a greater
problem. They may be attractive targets for terrorists, and their owners in
extreme cases may not be able to internalize terrorism risks. If terrorism
risks prove prohibitively high in probability and intensity (and the United
States is nowhere near this point) and preventive measures are limited, it is
conceivable that few people would want to lease space in skyscrapers and
that these buildings would cease to be economically viable. This possibility
is an extremely remote prospect given the current level of terrorist threats,
and local and national pride would obviously preclude even considering the
demolition of these landmarks.
73. See Howard, supra note 16, at 20 (noting that in the seven months since September 11,
2001, "the market has stabilized, more capacity has become available, and prices have dropped"
and that those seeking policies could find availability of up to $I billion in terrorism insurance
coverage, albeit at very high prices that reflect the estimated risks).
74. CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., supra note 16, at 5-10.
75. For example, as of April 2002, terrorism insurance was required for high-risk parties
representing only ten percent of the dollar amount of loans extended by commercial banks. See
Fed. Reserve Bd., Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices (Apr. 2002), at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SnLoanSurvey/200205/default.htm.
76. CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., supra note 16, at 5.
77. Moody's Investors Serv., supra note 13, at 4-5.
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The ongoing economic viability of skyscrapers absent terrorism
insurance is certainly plausible. U.S. cities have faced some threat of
nuclear attack from the Soviet Union (and now Russia) since the U.S.S.R.'s
first atomic test in 1949. In spite of the fact that insurers have routinely
excluded nuclear attack and war coverage,78 the construction of new
skyscrapers and the maintenance of old skyscrapers continued throughout
the hottest points of the Cold War. Regardless of their ability to internalize
terrorism risks, high-risk parties possessed more than sufficient incentives
to lobby for the government to assume much of the cost of these risks, as
the following Section will discuss.
C. The Political Impetus for Government Intervention
The economic concerns are only one part of the story of government
intervention. Even if the "free market" approach of allowing insurance
markets and private parties to adjust to terrorism risks on their own
appeared a viable and appealing solution, policy decisions rarely, if ever,
occur in a political vacuum. In the present case, the rent-seeking incentives
of high-risk private actors and reelection motives of politicians combined to
ensure that politics would play a far larger role in the decision to intervene
than the more modest underlying economic concerns.
1. The Incentives for the Formation of a Political Coalition
To Lobby for Intervention
The drama of the World Trade Center attacks created an opportunity for
the parties most at risk to act as political entrepreneurs in marketing the
unavailability of terrorism insurance as a "crisis" that demanded a federal
solution.79 As discussed in the previous Section, following a transitional
period, most property owners could purchase terrorism insurance, albeit at
higher prices. A relatively small but defined group of high-risk, large-scale
property owners either could not acquire terrorism insurance at all, or only
at prohibitively expensive prices. Insurers shared a common interest with
high-risk property holders in shifting the dangers of their misestimation of
terrorist risk probabilities and liquidity concerns to the federal
government.80 This context presented a classic case of a concentrated group
united by a common interest that possessed the incentives and means to
78. See Rappe, supra note 23, at 363-65.
79. See Hulse, supra note 51 (noting the twenty billion dollars allocated by Congress for
relief for the World Trade Center attacks to New York City alone).
80. See Albert Warson, The Terrorism Insurance Impasse, MORTGAGE BANKING, May 2002,
at 76, 78-83.
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organize to seek rents whose costs would be borne by a diffuse group of
taxpayers.
8 1
Any coalition building for rent-seeking entails significant
organizational and coordination costs.82 Nonetheless, the scale of rents
potentially at stake in government terrorism insurance intervention provided
sufficient incentives to unite an impressive alliance of insurer, construction,
manufacturing, real estate, and other business associations under an
umbrella advocacy group, the Coalition to Insure Against Terrorism.
83
Other groups supported the plan, but the Coalition spearheaded public
debate on a government reinsurance plan. 84 Each of these groups stood to
gain rents from shifting the costs of terrorism risks onto the shoulders of the
federal government. The broad nature of the coalition gave the appearance
(however illusory) of credence to their claims that they were speaking in the
interest of the economy, yet clearly gave the campaigners economic muscle
and political influence to secure their objectives. The public record is
largely silent as to why the Coalition to Insure Against Terror embraced an
approach of seeking government reinsurance. One might imagine that
businesses would have preferred the predictability of the direct provision of
insurance by the government and the possibility of exerting direct pressure
on such an authority to fix lower rates and more favorable terms. 5
Nonetheless, Part III will discuss how the reinsurance plan serves as a
political and economic compromise whose use of market pricing by private
insurers and copayments and deductibles limits the distorting effects of
government intervention and the degree of implicit subsidies. This
"backstop" approach may have been easier to "sell" to the public as either a
cover for rent-seeking objectives or means to gain wider support because of
the plan's built-in constraints. Even if the latter effect of built-in constraints
of the plan are what makes the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act notable, the
81. See Saul Levmore, Coalitions and Quakes: Disaster Relief and Its Prevention, 3 U. CHI.
L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 1-3 (1996) (describing how catastrophes affecting discrete groups are the
most likely to result in groups organizing and receiving government-sponsored relief).
82. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 43-52 (1971) (showing how small, defined groups are the most likely to
overcome the transaction costs and free-rider problems entailed in organizing collective action);
Macey, supra note 21, at 46-51 (arguing that small, defined groups are best able to identify
information costs and organizational costs to secure rents).
83. The members of the Coalition to Insure Against Terrorism make up a veritable "who's
who" of associations representing groups that may be affected by terrorist attacks. Warson, supra
note 80, at 78; see also Joint Letter from Steve Bartlett, President of the Financial Services
Roundtable, and Edward C. Sullivan, President of the Building and Construction Trades
Department of the AFL-CIO, to President George W. Bush (Feb. 20, 2002), at
http://www.fsround.org/PDFs/FSR-BCTPOTUS.pdf (detailing cooperation between businesses
and construction-related labor unions on the issue).
84. See Warson, supra note 80, at 78-80.
85. See infra Subsection III.C. 1 (comparing the different incentives created under reinsurance
with direct government provision plans).
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reinsurance plan as safety net story fits well with the economic story of
crisis that the Act's proponents told.
2. The Significance of Public-Problem Construction and
Poster Children
Advocates had an economic story of crisis to bring the issue of
terrorism insurance to the forefront of the public agenda. In the wake of the
World Trade Center attacks, they argued that the insurance industry lacked
both the capacity and willingness to insure terrorism risks. 86 Proponents
claimed that the remaining terrorism insurance being offered was inherently
inadequate in its scope and coverage and prohibitively expensive. 87 They
highlighted alleged economic effects of the insurance unavailability on the
construction industry and on other businesses in deepening the current
economic downturn.88 Advocates painted a specter of a larger economic
threat posed by widespread uninsured losses from future catastrophic
attacks.
They crystallized this message of crisis for the general public and
politicians through using poster children to appeal to popular compassion,
such as construction workers who were allegedly unemployed because their
constructor employers could not secure terrorism insurance. 89 They pointed
to famous landmarks that were vulnerable to attack and the owners of
which were similarly unable to acquire or afford terrorism insurance to
appeal to national pride. They also highlighted the lack of terrorism
insurance for infrastructure, such as airports or malls, in order to plug into
popular fears about terrorism.90 Economically, these claims were weak
because trophy building owners and others at risk should have simply
internalized terrorism risks if market forces had determined no premium
would be sufficient. Nonetheless, the power of the advocates' economic
story helped to transform potentially economically losing arguments into
political winners.
86. See, e.g., Press Release, Coalition To Insure Against Terrorism, Policyholders Launch
Coalition To Seek Passage of Terrorism Insurance Plan (Feb. 13, 2002), at
http://www.insureagainstterrorism.org/news_021302.html.
87. See, e.g., Coalition To Insure Against Terror, February 26 Letter to the Senate Leadership
Urging Senate Passage of a Terrorism Insurance Bill (Feb. 26, 2002), at
http://www.insureagainstterrorism.org/factsltr022602.html.
88. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 18 (quoting a spokesman who argued that the Act "is
about jobs, economic security and homeland security").
89. See George W. Bush, Remarks by the President to Business Leaders (Apr. 8, 2002), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020408-17.html (highlighting anecdotal
examples of building projects that could have created thousands of construction jobs in Nevada
and Chicago but had been abandoned or postponed allegedly because of an inability to acquire
terrorism insurance).
90. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 18.
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Advocates implicitly appreciated the fact that a bald story of rent-
seeking for affluent high-risk parties was unlikely to gain political traction
or pass a general interest test. Instead, they framed the availability and
affordability of terrorism insurance as an issue of fairness affecting all
potential property-casualty policyholders, not just the plan's advocates who
themselves stood to gain the most from government reinsurance.
Advocates effectively intertwined the issue of terrorism insurance with
the health of the economy at large and homeland security. 9' This shrewd
tactic raised the prominence of the issue during a time of economic
recession and high concerns for homeland security, while simultaneously
obfiscating advocates' primary motives of rent-seeking. This strategy built
popular support. Just as importantly, it provided slack as well as a pretext
for politicians both to demonstrate their efforts to deal with threats from
terrorism and to supply cloaked rents for political contributors.92 As Part III
will discuss, the particular form of government intervention through
reinsurance for all terrorism insurance, rather than targeted direct subsidies
or tax expenditures, reinforced the obfuscation of upwards redistribution
that the plan entails. This fact allowed both advocates and politicians to
argue that the Act created "a backstop, not a bailout" for the insurance
industry. 93 This distinction provided cover for advocates' rent-seeking ends
and the politicians who supported them.
3. Agenda Setting by Greasing the Wheels of Congress
The federal government was the primary focus of public and private
lobbying activities. While insurance regulation almost exclusively occurs at
the state level, 94 the federal government was the one party with the deep
pockets to meet the rent-seeking needs of insurers and high-risk property
owners. This point was especially true during a time when states were
facing their own budget crises because of the economic downturn. 95
91. See, e.g., Coalition To Insure Against Terrorism, supra note 87.
92. Slack is an idea laid out in Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture andIdeology in the
Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 279, 282-84 (1984), which shows how
principal-agent relationships between voters and their representatives necessarily entail "slack"
through which representatives fail to act in accordance with, and may shirk, voters' desires. See
also Levine & Forrence, supra note 9, at 174 (using the concept of slack to develop a theory of
when general-interest or special-interest legislation or regulation will occur and/or persist). In this
case, the economic story told by the Act's advocates created greater slack for politicians to
indulge the rent-seeking desires of their political contributors.
93. The Terrorism Risk Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 3210 Before the House Rules
Comm., 107th Cong., 2001 WL 1518590 (2001) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Michael G.
Oxley, Chairman, House Committee on Financial Services).
94. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2000) (establishing state regulatory
responsibility for insurance notwithstanding the Commerce Clause). The states' regulatory roles
will be discussed in depth in Subsection IlI.B.3.
95. See Dale Russakoff & Mike Allen, Governors' Meeting Verges on Partisan Warfare,
WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2003, at A5 (noting that states face budget deficits of $30 billion in 2003
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State insurance commissioners eagerly embraced the push for the
federal government to address terrorism risks through a reinsurance plan.
96
Many states had their own mini-reinsurance plans in the form of state
guarantee funds for insurers that partly pooled risks among insurers by
allowing state insurance commissioners to impose fees on solvent insurers
to assist insurers facing liquidity problems. 9" Healthy insurers' efforts to
minimize participation in state guarantee funds, however, greatly limited
the efficacy of these funds as liquidity-increasing devices.
98
The reinsurance plan enabled state regulators and legislators to shift
responsibility for the problem and the pressures for action from rent-seekers
toward the federal government. This approach allowed the federal
government to foot the bill for subsidizing insurers and high-risk property
owners, while preserving state regulatory oversight over the insurance
industry (and the potential contributions for state politicians that this control
brings). Regardless of the degree to which state insurance commissioners
functioned as truly independent regulators or were captured by the
insurance industry, state leaders stood to gain by shifting responsibility for
terrorism risks to the federal government.
Advocates of the reinsurance plan pursued a multilayered strategy of
private congressional lobbying, campaign contributions, and public appeals
to build political support. During the first six months of 2002 alone, the
insurance industry spent $33.6 million on lobbying Congress and the
President with the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act at the top of its agenda. 99
Insurers complemented lobbying with direct financial contributions during
the 2001-2002 election cycle of approximately $7.7 million to Republicans
and $4.2 million to Democrats. 0 0 The disproportionate support for the
Republicans reflects Republican control of the White House and the House
of Representatives, yet these contributions appeared high enough to attract
and $82 billion in 2004, and that states are seeking to lay blame for this situation on the federal
government and to gain new federal subsidies).
96. See Press Release, NAIC Outlines Principles for Federal Role in Terrorism Insurance
Coverage (Oct. 26, 2001), at http://www.naic.org/pressroom/releases/.
97. See James G. Bohn & Brian J. Hall, The Costs of Insurance Company Failures, in THE
ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE 139 (David F. Bradford ed., 1998); Bernard E.
Epton & Roger A. Bixby, Insurance Guarantee Funds: A Reassessment, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 227,
228-35 (1976).
98. See Bohn & Hall, supra note 97, at 139-40.
99. See Political Money Line, Lobbying Expenditures Surged in First Six Months of 2002, at
http://www.tray.com/cgi-win/indexhtml.exe?MBF=2002mylobby (last visited Apr. 1, 2003).
Property-casualty insurers had the most to gain through government reinsurance that immediately
applied to them, The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act builds in the possibility of the plan's extension
to life insurers as well, giving the entire insurance industry a tremendous interest in its enactment.
See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 103(h), (i), 116 Stat. 2322,
2332 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 248, 1610, 6701 (West Supp. 2003)).
100. See Political Money Line, 2001-2002 Election Cycle, at http://www.tray.com/cgi-
win/xee.exe?DoFn=02F (last visited Apr. 1, 2003) (laying out Federal Election Commission data
as of March 5, 2003).
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the attention of both reelection-seeking politicians and political parties.
These numbers do not include the countless millions additionally spent in
federal lobbying and campaign contributions by business associations and
other high-risk property holders who stood to gain large rents from
government intervention.
Academics have proven that agenda setting can be more important than
substantive support for a policy in ensuring its enactment vis-A-vis other
alternatives.'l1 Insurers and other advocates sought to ensure that terrorism
insurance would be at the forefront of the congressional agenda through
focusing lobbying and campaign contributions on the members of the
Senate Banking Committee and House Committee on Financial Services,
the committees responsible for agenda setting on insurance industry issues.
For example, during the 2001-2002 election cycle the insurance industry
gave $113,300 and was the third largest contributor to Michael G. Oxley,
chairman of the House Committee on Financial Services. 10 2 The insurance
industry gave more than $1.5 million in campaign contributions to
Financial Services Committee members. 10 3 Finance, insurance, and real
estate PACs combined to give more than $6.5 million to members of the
Financial Services Committee.' 0 4 The insurance industry's contributions to
the Banking Committee members similarly sought to ensure that terrorism
insurance remained high on the Senate's agenda.
1 0 5
101. See generally Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence and Its
Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561 (1977) (discussing the importance of agenda setting in shaping
legislative outcomes); Charles R. Plott & Michael E. Levine, A Model of Agenda Influence on
Committee Decisions, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 146 (1978) (showing how it is possible to map
different democratic outcomes based on differences in the division of outcomes into voting
packages, the order of presenting them, and the voting methods used to adopt them). See also
KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d cd. 1963) (laying out
Arrow's Theorem, which establishes that there is no way to aggregate preferences that is both
democratic and consistent and therefore suggests that, given any set of voter preferences, any
democratic method for aggregating these preferences will be inconsistent and can lead to
inconsistent outcomes).
102. Open Secrets, Michael G. Oxley: 2002 Politician Profile, at http://www.opensecrets.org/
politicians/indus.asp?cid=N00003736&cycle=2002 (last visited Apr. 1, 2003) (laying out Federal
Election Commission data as of March 5, 2003).
103. Open Secrets, Top Industries Giving to Committee Members, at
http://www.opensecrets.org/cmteprofiles/indus.asp?CmtelD=H05&Cmte=HFIN&CongNo= 107&
Chamber-H (last visited Apr. 1, 2003) (laying out Federal Election Commission data as of March
5, 2003).
104. Id.
105. Open Secrets, Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee: Member
Money, at http://www.opensecrets.org/cmteprofiles/profiles.asp?CmtelD=S06&Cmte=SBAN&
CongNo=107&Chamber=S&Indus=F09 (last visited Apr. 1, 2003). Contributions to Committee
Chairman Paul Sarbanes are comparatively low from all sources during this period as he faced
only nominal reelection opposition, but his campaign contributions from insurers appear
proportionately the same as from other major industries.
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4. Incentives for Reelection-Minded Politicians
No smoking gun links money to agenda setting and votes by
congressmen, yet reelection-minded politicians had every incentive to push
for government intervention on the issue of terrorism insurance. 1° 6 Not only
did fund-raising contributions provide incentives for paybacks in agenda
setting and votes, but terrorism was also the issue of the day in popular
minds during an election year. 0 7 Politicians of every stripe seeking
reelection wanted to have their name at the forefront of enhancing
homeland security. Advocates' public campaigns effectively interlinked the
need for terrorism insurance with homeland security and the economic
downturn. 10 8 This fact allowed politicians to claim that they were
addressing both concerns, while simultaneously providing a cover for
fulfilling the rent-seeking needs of their campaign contributors. 
109
The additional advantage for politicians was that the combination of the
World Trade Center attacks and the Bush tax cut had ended a period of
relative budgetary restraint, especially for addressing terrorist concerns. The
particular proposal of government reinsurance that politicians focused on
had the additional appeal of not entailing any government expenditures
until the occurrence of terrorist attacks. And if and when that support
kicked in, it would provide an opportunity for politicians to trumpet their
success in having guaranteed that individuals had the opportunity to be
insured and that insurers had the liquidity to meet obligations from terrorist
attacks.
The formation of a powerful coalition of insurers and high-risk parties,
their effective campaign to interlink terrorism insurance with economic and
homeland security concerns, and politicians' incentives to demonstrate that
they were addressing economic and homeland security issues all combined
to make government intervention virtually inevitable. Given the strong
pressures for government intervention, Part III will argue that the
reinsurance plan compares favorably to past federal government insurance
intervention and the primary alternative of direct government provision.
106. Cf. 148 CONG. REc. SI 1,524 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2002), 2002 WL 31600115 (recording
the opposition of Senator Phil Gramm of Texas to the Act). Senator Gramm's autonomy to oppose
the Act may have been shaped by his imminent retirement.
107. Stanley B. Greenberg, What Voters Want, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 5, 2002, at A 15.
108. See, e.g., Warson, supra note 80, at 85 (quoting a Coalition to Insure Against Terror
spokesman, who stated that "[i]t is more than a little unsettling to note that roadways, public
facilities, office complexes, stadiums and crucial elements of infrastructure that are part of our
daily lives are not adequately insured against terrorist attack.... The implications are
staggering.").
109. See Macey, supra note 21, at 51-52 (framing legislators as political entrepreneurs who
actively seek to embrace and control issues that will maximize their electoral support while
allowing them to supply rents to organized interests).
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III. ASSESSING THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002
A. An Overview of the Provisions of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act created a temporary federal
government reinsurance program the professed goal of which is to protect
consumers by ensuring the "widespread availability and affordability of
property and casualty insurance for terrorism risk" at "reasonable and
predictable prices."' 10 This federal reinsurance program of up to three years
mandates that all commercial property and casualty insurance providers
offer terrorism insurance."' The Act creates a federal backstop of
reinsurance, yet seeks to preserve the role of market forces in setting
premiums.112 The Act claims to seek to mitigate disruptions in the terrorism
insurance market in the short term and thereby to give insurers space in
which to develop the systems, mechanisms, and products necessary to
sustain a private terrorism insurance market in the long term.' 13
1. Ninety Percent Reinsurance Coverage Above Insurer Deductibles
The Act has four main features. First, the Act commits the federal
government to pay insurers 90% of annual losses from terrorist acts above
insurer deductibles, until industry-wide losses equal $100 billion annually.
Federal reinsurance compensation begins only after insurance companies
114have paid out substantial deductibles based on direct earned premiums.
Compensation for terrorist attacks occurs only for recognized attacks that
inflict at least $5 million of damage. 15 The Act requires individual insurers
to cover losses for acts of terrorism equal to 1% of direct earned premiums
in 2002, 7% in 2003, 10% in 2004, and 15% in 2005.116 After individual
insurers meet their deductibles, the federal government will pay 90% of
losses, up to $100 billion in losses. If losses exceed $100 billion, then
110. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 101(a)(1)-(b)(1), 116
Stat. 2322, 2324 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 248, 1610, 6701 (West Supp. 2003)).
111. Id. §§ 102(6), 103(a). The Act explicitly excludes health insurance, designated federally
backed insurance programs, medical malpractice, and personal lines of insurance and reinsurance.
Id. § 102(12)(B). The Treasury Secretary has discretion to expand the program to group life
insurers if it proves successful and she determines that the need exists. The Secretary must also




114. Direct earned premiums are the aggregate of premiums paid to insurance companies by
individuals and corporations for property and casualty insurance protection. Id. §§ 102(4),
103(e)(7).
115. Id. § 102(1)(B)(ii).
116. Id. § 102(7). These deductibles are termed "marketplace aggregate retention." Id.
§ 103(e)(6).
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Congress must consider whether and on what terms the federal government
will provide further compensation. 
1 7
2. Mandatory and Discretionary Recoupment of
Government Compensation
Second, the Treasury Department has both mandatory and discretionary
provisions for recouping the compensation paid by the federal government
for terrorist attacks." 8 If the insurance industry's total uncompensated
losses from terrorist attacks (the aggregate of insurance companies'
deductibles plus the 10% copayments) are less than $10 billion in 2003,
$12.5 billion in 2004, or $15 billion in 2005, then the Treasury Secretary
must recoup all government funds." 9 The formula is that the Treasury
Department must recoup the difference between $10 billion in 2003, $12.5
billion in 2004, or $15 billion in 2005 and the aggregate of insurers'
uncompensated losses for each year, until the government recovers all
federal compensation. 120 If the aggregate of all insurers' uncompensated
losses from terrorist attacks exceeds $10 billion in 2003, $12.5 billion in
2004, or $15 billion in 2005, then no mandatory recoupment applies for that
year. 12
The Treasury Secretary has discretion with regard to the timing for
recouping these funds.122 She must, however, order insurers on an industry-
wide basis to collect an annual surcharge of up to 3% of premiums on all
property-casualty policyholders until the amount of mandatory recoupment
is met. 123 In turn, these insurers must remit these monies to the federal
government.124 The Act allows the Treasury Secretary to fix lower
percentages for smaller commercial and rural areas and different lines of
insurance, so that types of property at greater risk face a higher percentage
of any surcharge.' 
25
These provisions for mandatory recoupment are relatively minor
compared to the Secretary's expansive discretionary recoupment powers.
The Act vests the Treasury Secretary with the discretion to order the
recoupment of all government compensation above the mandatory
recoupment amount. 126 Exercise of this theoretical power is highly unlikely,
117. Id. § 103(e)(2)-(3).
118. Id. § 103(e)(7).
119. Id. § 103(e)(7)(A)-(C).
120. Id.
121. Id. § 103(e)(7)(B).
122. Id. § 103(e)(8) (granting the Treasury Secretary wide discretion in determining the
timing for recoupment of government funds).
123. Id. § 103(e)(8)(C).
124. Id. § 103(e)(7).
125. Id. § 103(e)(8)(D).
126. Id. § 103(e)(7)(D).
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in light of political pressures from reelection-seeking politicians and rent-
seeking beneficiaries in times of catastrophe. The Secretary must make her
decision based on considerations of the cost of this program to the taxpayer,
the economic conditions in the insurance industry, the affordability of
property-casualty insurance, and any other condition she deems
appropriate. 27 The Act is silent on whether the Treasury Secretary should
favor concerns of fiscal responsibility, the overall economy, or the
affordability of property-casualty insurance in exercising this power.128
3. "Temporary" Mandate for Insurers To Offer Terrorism Insurance
Third, the quid pro quo for this safety net is a federal mandate that
insurance companies make available terrorism insurance for the next two
years, which can be extended by the Treasury Secretary for a third year
until December 31, 2005.129 The Act nullifies all terrorism exclusions in
existing policies. 130 It requires that insurers offer terrorism insurance with
terms, amounts, and other coverage limitations materially similar to those
that apply to other protected property and casualty losses.'31 What the term
"materially similar" means is left open-ended.1 2 This fact gives insurance
companies discretion to estimate the risk of terrorist attacks and to charge a
price that reflects their risk estimates, however high. 133 For the first year of
price setting for terrorism insurance, state regulators may not oversee
pricing decisions in advance and may only regulate prices if they appear
abusive. 1
34
4. Policyholders' Right Not To Pay the Additional Premium and
To Reject Coverage
Fourth, the Act requires insurance companies to disclose to present and
future policyholders the premium charged for terrorism insurance and the
federal share of coverage for terrorism losses.' 35 The Act mandates that
insurers separately tabulate the cost of terrorism insurance coverage from
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. § 103(c)(2).
130. Id. § 105.
131. Id. § 103(c)(1)(B).
132. Id. § 103(c)(1).
133. Id.
134. Id. § 106(a)(2)(B).
135. The Treasury Department has recognized the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners' Model Forms for disclosure of premiums for terrorism insurance as a "safe
harbor" that satisfies the statute's requirements. See Treasury Dep't, Interim Guidance Concerning
New Statutory Disclosure and Mandatory Availability Requirements of the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002 (Dec. 3, 2002), at http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/
fmancial-institution/terrorism-insurance/pdf/interimguide.pdf.
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the overall insurance premium. This approach is designed to heighten
transparency and to encourage prospective policyholders to compare
premiums, so that market forces will help to keep premiums affordable.
Present policyholders will have ninety days to choose to accept or reject
the terrorism insurance coverage offered by their insurers. If present or
future policyholders choose to reject the additional premium for terrorism
insurance, they will not receive federal protections. Insurance companies
will then be able to reinstate their terrorism exclusions. New purchasers of
property-casualty insurance will have the option to pay a separate premium
for terrorism insurance or to accept the terrorism exclusions that insurers
may impose if they decline to pay the premium.
B. The Potential Shortcomings of the Act
From an economic perspective, almost any form of government
intervention to limit private terrorism risks is going to result in upwards
redistribution and have distorting effects on private insurance markets.
136
Given that rent-seeking and political concerns are driving federal action on
terrorism insurance, the economic choice is one between lesser evils in
terms of the effects of government intervention. This Section will focus on
four potential shortcomings facing the Act: moral hazards for the insured,
adverse selection because of insurers' mandate to offer terrorism insurance,
challenges facing the integration of a federal reinsurance system with state
regulatory regimes, and moral hazards created by the possibility of ex post
relief to the uninsured or underinsured.
1. The Moral Hazards for the Insured
The reinsurance plan created by the Act represents a political and
economic compromise. Its use of copayments and deductibles limits, yet far
from eliminates, moral hazards. For obvious reasons, the ideal for
beneficiaries of government insurance would be to foist all risks on the
federal government, an approach that may have highly distorting effects on
actors' behavior. The reinsurance plan shifts much of the risks of
catastrophic terrorism attacks to the government's shoulders. Therefore, the
plan partly reduces the incentives for private firms to monitor the use of
preventive measures by insured parties and/or to employ loss-sharing
devices. 137 By definition any government insurance subsidy is going to
136. See Epstein, supra note 25, at 299-300 (arguing that any government intervention aimed
at reducing the effects of catastrophic risks is likely to cause more harm than allowing the market
to address the dislocations that catastrophes cause).
137. See Harrington, supra note 38, at 41.
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create moral hazards by reducing incentives for preventive measures."'
This potential moral hazard is severe when dealing with flood insurance or
crop insurance where the payoff from exposure to the trigger event of flood
or crop damage may far exceed the gains from the adoption of effective
prevention measures by the insured.
139
In contrast, moral hazards appear less significant in the context of
terrorism insurance, but are present nonetheless. Three main factors would
at least partially limit moral hazards with regard to terrorism exposure.
Insured parties would still be concerned about the severe risks to human life
posed by terrorist threats, face risks of continued exposure to
uncompensated punitive damages for negligence if they fail to adopt
precautions, 40 and may incur reputational costs if they do not adopt a
modicum of preventive measures.
The existence of a federal insurance subsidy, however, still introduces
significant moral hazards for insurers and policyholders. Decreased risks
are likely to enhance incentives for both insurers and insured to embrace
greater risk-seeking behavior. In the context of terrorist threats, this may
entail lower-priced terrorism insurance effectively subsidizing the
construction of more investments that are exposed to higher risks, such as
skyscrapers that may offer appealing terrorist targets. In spite of this
potentially distorting effect, Section III.C will discuss how a virtue of the
Act is that it preserves some incentives for insurers and insured to take
preventive measures and to continue to internalize some of the risk
exposure from their actions.
2. The Unavoidability of Adverse Selection Problems
Moral hazards for the insured are a concern under the Act, but on its
face adverse selection appears to be a larger and more pervasive problem.
The mandate that private insurers offer terrorism insurance for property-
casualty policyholders without a corresponding purchase requirement, for
either policyholders or property owners more broadly, may expose both the
federal government and insurers to significant adverse selection problems.
Some degree of adverse selection is almost unavoidable in any scheme for
138. See DARIUS LAKDAWALLA & GEORGE ZANJANI, INSURANCE, SELF-PROTECTION, AND
THE ECONOMICS OF TERRORISM 1-2, 9-13 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
9215, 2002), at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9215.pdf (showing both how government
insurance subsidies in general, and subsidized terrorism insurance in particular, will reduce
incentives for self-protection measures).
139. See Priest, supra note 11, at 224-25 (noting that federal crop insurance policyholders
systematically earn more in years in which their crops are damaged because they receive federal
compensation).
140. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 209 (describing the role of punitive damages and liability
rules as risk-regulation devices).
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subsidized insurance, so the question is to what extent the plan limits this
potential. If private insurers faced no requirement to offer terrorism
insurance to a given party, they could guard against adverse selection by
utilizing proxies of geography, type of asset, and case-by-case assessments
of risk to decide whether to offer policies. Under the Act, insurers must
offer terrorism insurance coverage. Insurers' control of risk probability
estimates and pricing, however, may allow them to use both proxies and
case-by-case analysis to impose costs sufficiently high to compel
prospective high-risk policyholders to internalize much of these risks.
The potential for adverse selection may also be much less in the context
of terrorism insurance than in many other areas of insurance. When facing
other risks, a given individual may enjoy an asymmetry of knowledge vis-A-
vis insurers. For example, a policyholder may have knowledge about a
genetic condition to which insurers may not be privy. It is unclear that there
is a significant asymmetry between private insurers and the insured in terms
of their ability to anticipate exposure to terrorism risks.
The insured parties will know more accurately than insurers what
preventive measures they are taking. Part of the economic rationale (and an
underlying assumption) for government reinsurance in the first place,
however, is that the misestimation risks for terrorism insurance premium
calculations are quite high. Individual policyholders are likely to have even
less idea of these probabilities than are private insurers. Given private
insurers' experience in making case-by-case assessments, they are also
likely to have advantages in mitigating adverse selection problems
compared to a federal agency.
3. The Challenges of Integrating Federal Reinsurance with
State Regulatory Regimes
The Act creates a hybrid system in which the federal government
oversees administration of the reinsurance plan, insurers set prices for
terrorism insurance, and state regulators continue to regulate the prices of
insurers.14 ' The decision to leave regulatory oversight of insurers in the
hands of state insurance commissioners appears to be a product of political
expediency, rather than an affirmation of the superior efficacy of state
regulation of the insurance industry. Congressional committees have begun
to consider the possibility of creating an optional federal charter system for
the insurance industry, 142 and the question of expanded federal regulation
141. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 106, 116 Stat. 2322, 2334
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 248, 1610, 6701 (West Supp. 2003)).
142. See generally Insurance Regulation and Competition for the 21st Century: Hearings
Before the House Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored
Enterprises, 107th Cong. (June 4, 11, 18, 2002), at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/
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over the insurance industry may divide both Congress and the insurance
industry for many years to come. Proponents of the reinsurance plan wisely
sidestepped this controversy to secure passage of the Act, and upheld the
longstanding federal policy of deferring to state-level regulation of the
insurance industry. 143 The Treasury Secretary and Attorney General do
possess the sole ability to certify the occurrence of a terrorist attack that
triggers reinsurance compensation, 44 and the Treasury Secretary oversees
the administration of the reinsurance program.1
45
It is far from obvious that the interests of state regulators will converge
with those of the federal government. The Act appears to assume, however,
that these interests will overlap and that oversight by states will assist the
federal government's ends. The Act's professed (if somewhat nebulous)
goal was to ensure the "widespread availability and affordability of
property and casualty insurance for terrorism risk"'146 at "reasonable and
predictable prices."' 14 7 To that end, the Act mandates that insurers offer
terrorism insurance on materially similar terms and amounts, and with
similar coverage limitations, as apply to other protected property and
casualty losses.' 48 What the term "materially similar" means is left open-
ended.
1 49
In the short term, the Act limits oversight of terrorism insurance prices
by individual states in order to allow insurers to bypass any prior state
approval requirements for terrorism insurance prices until December 31,
2003.150 This provision appears designed to ensure that the transition to
offering terrorism insurance under the reinsurance plan is not delayed. In
the long run, however, the plan leaves oversight of insurers in the hands of
the states. This fact means that the states alone must resolve what
"materially similar" terms or "reasonable and predictable" prices are, or
else simply ignore this implicit federal mandate. Given the lack of
enforcement provisions at the federal level or an explicit mandate for state
regulators to pursue these ends, it may be that Congress was content to give
lip service to somewhat unrealistic objectives, while implicitly attempting
to shift responsibility for achieving these goals to insurers and state
regulators.
bank/hba80131.000/hba8013 IO.HTM (discussing state efforts to reform insurance regulation and
arguments for the creation of an optional federal charter regime).
143. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2000) (vesting insurance regulation
in states).
144. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 102(1).
145. Id. § 104.
146. Id. § 101(b)(1).
147. Id. § 101(a)(1).
148. Id. § 103(c)(1)(B).
149. Id. § 103(c)(1).
150. Id. § 106(a)(2)(B).
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The insurance industry is heavily regulated at the state level., 5 Some
states such as Illinois have "open competition" rules that largely allow the
market to set prices. 152 In others, state insurance commissioners must
approve insurance prices in advance or have the right to reject prices for a
set period of time after they are submitted to regulators. 153 In these states,
rate regulatory approval processes provide insurance commissioners with
the means to monitor insurance companies to make sure that insurers are
complying with the Act's requirements of offering coverage on materially
similar terms as other coverage. The offices of state insurance
commissioners have, however, historically been targets for rent-seeking and
regulatory capture of state agencies by insurers. 15 4 This fact means that
capture at the state level may help to distort or undercut some of the Act's
agenda.
A degree of state regulator divergence from federal goals or even state
agency capture may not necessarily be all bad, at least in the following
limited sense. The Act's professed goals appear mere aspirations. This point
is suggested by the fact that what constitutes reasonable and predictable
prices is left undefined by the Act. It is also far from clear what "materially
similar" terms would entail as the very nature of insurance calculations
presupposes many assumptions specific to a given risk. As detailed earlier,
terrorism risks entail significantly different types of challenges than other
risks, and, therefore, insurers could sidestep these requirements by positing
different assumptions.
State rate-regulation review processes may provide slack for insurers to
pursue this end and to thereby circumvent these requirements of the Act.
Even if state insurance commissioners actively tried to uphold the Act's
stated objectives, it is far from clear that this goal would be an
economically desirable end. One of the advantages of vesting pricing
decisions in the hands of insurers is to give insurers the flexibility to gauge
the risks more accurately and, therefore, to temper the distorting effects of
the implicit reinsurance subsidies. Attempts by state regulators to force
insurers to offer policies on materially similar terms or to have "reasonable
and predictable" rates might undercut this more important objective.
The second potential problem posed by regulatory capture is more
troubling. The capture of a state insurance commissioner's office may
provide insurers with cover to retain many of the implicit subsidies that the
Act creates. State insurance commissioners often face nebulous state
151. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 95-132 (3d ed. 2000).
152. See ILL. DEP'T OF INS., ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON
INSURANCE COST CONTAINMENT (1999), at http://www.ins.state.il.us/Reports/ccreport/
ccreport99.htm#IV.
153. See ABRAHAM, supra note 151, at 109-16.
154. Id. at 114-15.
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mandates of ensuring reasonable rates of return for insurers while
containing costs for insurers. This fact, combined with the inherent
ambiguities of risk probability calculations by insurers, may provide slack
for state regulators to pass on rents to insurers by sanctioning higher prices
than private markets would have generated. Since state insurance
commissioners possess exclusive power to approve pricing decisions for
their jurisdiction, they could attempt to facilitate price collusion among
insurers through rate regulation. This problem has been historically hard to
prove and could lead to the significant retention of rents by insurers. Since
consumers may only see decreasing prices and not the lower prices that
competitive markets would have created, the partial retention of rents by
insurers may be too opaque to provoke a political backlash.
At the same time, this danger is tempered by the transparency of
terrorism insurance prices since the Act mandates that insurers list the price
for this coverage separately. The existence of fifty state regimes may also
check this rent retention. Consumer watchdog groups or the media may
highlight significant divergences in terrorism pricing across states to
indicate potential agency capture by insurers. The salience of terrorism
insurance may make reelection-seeking politicians unwilling to risk
potential political backlashes by letting insurers siphon off too much of the
implicit rents.
In spite of state rate regulation, the insurance industry has many
features of a competitive industry in which no single firm or set of
dominant firms can determine industry output. State entry conditions and
pricing oversight form some barriers to entry, 155 yet the industry consists of
a large number of competing firms with moderate concentration.'56 This
fact combined with the possibility for great variation in insurers' estimates
of terrorism risk probabilities may create downward price pressures on
regulators and the industry.
Partial implementation of the Act by state regulation poses potential
shortcomings. Creating another federal bureaucracy to monitor insurers
directly or the state regulators who oversee insurers, however, was both
politically unviable and likely to create more problems than it would solve.
While there is a danger that insurers may retain some of the implicit
155. The two primary barriers to entry are state capital requirements and price-regulation
oversight. For an overview of the policy objectives that generally define state rate regulation, see
BANKS McDOWELL, DEREGULATION & COMPETITION IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 34-49
(1989).
156. More than 3300 property-casualty insurance companies exist in the United States. See
PETER M. LENcsis, INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN OVERVIEW FOR
BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT, at vii (1997). The top four insurers accounted for twenty-eight
percent of the market, and the top fifty insurers accounted for seventy-eight percent of the market
as of 2001. See Ins. Serv. Offices, Inc., Property/Casualty Insurance Concentration, at
http://www.financialservicesfacts.org/financial2/insurance/pc/concentr/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2003).
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subsidies created by the Act, pressures from consumers who helped to
secure these rents will likely help to mitigate this danger as well.
4. The Intractable Problem of Political Commitments and
Ex Post Moral Hazard
Another shortcoming of this plan-or any form of government subsidy
for insurance-is that the same incentives that would lead politicians to
enact the reinsurance program in the first place may lead them to extend ex
post relief to those who were not insured or underinsured. 57 It is possible
that politicians could point to the existence of the program to encourage
more people to buy insurance up-front. This approach could limit the moral
hazard by reducing expectations of compensation for the uninsured after a
terrorist attack. For low-level attacks, this approach may actually work. In
these instances politicians may face less popular pressure to relieve high-
risk parties who had the chance to buy reinsurance yet chose to internalize
the risk in the hope of compensation after the fact.
The primacy of politicians' reelection motives and the public's
knowledge of this fact, however, make it difficult to imagine that the
reinsurance program will eliminate this moral hazard.158 The almost annual
ritual of awarding subsidies to uninsured flood victims when federal
insurance is readily available highlights this dilemma."" This problem
appears almost unavoidable for any government insurance plan, unless
politicians employed a constitutional precommitment device to limit
compensation, which seems politically implausible. 160  Although the
numbers are preliminary, only twenty-five percent of property-casualty
holders offered terrorism insurance have purchased it.' 61 This fact may
reflect the still significant prices for terrorism insurance or the choice to
internalize this risk. The low participation rate, however, may suggest a
widespread faith that the federal government will still compensate the
uninsured in the event of a terrorist attack.
One way to attempt to mitigate this problem would be to make
terrorism insurance mandatory for all purchasers of property-casualty
insurance. 162 Even this cure may have a limited effect, for individuals may
157. See Harrington, supra note 38, at 40.
158. See Roger G. Noll, The Complex Politics of Catastrophe Economics, 12 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 141, 142-43 (1996) (describing how benevolence has political benefits for
politicians when they spend public funds to aid catastrophe victims).
159. See Harrington, supra note 38, at 44.
160. Epstein, supra note 25, at 287 (criticizing the inability of political institutions to
maintain long-term commitments in the face of catastrophes).
161. See Mark A. Hoffinan, Few Buying TRIA Cover, BUs. INS., Feb. 24, 2003, at 1.
162. This tool gives the government a theoretical advantage over other insurers in having the
ability to eliminate adverse selection problems, which is the case for Social Security. See Priest,
supra note 11, at 227.
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choose to internalize other property-casualty risks and rely on the hope of
government intervention in the event of a terrorist catastrophe. An even
greater shortcoming of this approach is that mandating property-casualty
insurance may merely accentuate the degree to which the plan engages in
upward distribution toward affluent parties who have the highest risks.
163
Some universally mandatory insurance programs, such as state
requirements for automobile insurance, do effect upward redistribution,
although this policy is officially justified by concerns about moral hazards
posed by judgment-proof drivers. 164 But mandatory coverage may prove to
be difficult both to enforce and to make politically palatable.
The difficulty in crafting credible political commitments creates a
moral hazard that is very hard to resolve. The advantage of the reinsurance
plan is that it may allow for the existence of a degree of line drawing
between the effects of low-level attacks that individuals and insurers must
presumably address and what the federal government will address. While
the point is thankfully hypothetical to date, the temptation of reelection-
seeking politicians to give aid to the uninsured may prove irresistible if
terrorist attacks of any kind occur once again.
C. The Strengths of the Act and the Path for Reform
The primary virtue of the reinsurance plan under the Act over potential
government alternatives is its indirect approach. The Act continues to vest
pricing decisions and risk estimations in the hands of the private market.
165
The use of copayments and deductibles limits the distorting effects of
government intervention. 66 This approach partly intertwines the incentives
of private insurers and the state and may provide both insurers and insured
with incentive to reduce risk exposure and to limit the implicit rents.
Significant political constraints may serve both to limit the potential for
reform and to extend the plan's half-life. With these points in mind, this
Section will suggest ways to strengthen the reinsurance plan that may create
superior political and economic incentives for regulators, insurers, and the
insured.
163. But see id. (critiquing the potential for upward redistribution through mandatory
coverage requirements).
164. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 25, at 297 (arguing that mandatory automobile insurance is
primarily designed as a redistributive mechanism for safer drivers to subsidize more risky drivers,
and, implicitly, those with cheaper cars to subsidize owners with more expensive cars); cf
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHIAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL
INSURANCE 62-64 (1999) (discussing the downward redistribution of Social Security that forms
the model of politically palatable mandatory insurance coverage).
165. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 101(b)(2), 116 Stat.
2322, 2323 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 248, 1610, 6701 (West Supp. 2003)).
166. See id. § 103(e)(1), (e)(7).
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1. Learning from the Government's Poor Track Record as an Insurer
The federal government has a long track record of poorly designed
insurance policies. This fact creates understandable skepticism as to its
potential efficacy as an insurer.1 67 One strength of this reinsurance plan,
however, is that its design appears to reflect lessons learned from the
shortcomings of past government insurance plans.
Most government insurance programs have offered direct subsidized
insurance following the model of Federal Crop Insurance and the National
Flood Insurance Program. 168 These subsidized insurance programs are
optional, which creates adverse selection problems, for only those with the
most risks purchase policies. Payoffs generally occur regardless of whether
the insured parties have adopted required preventive measures or
purposefully courted exposure to the danger through risk-seeking decisions
to build or plant. Even worse, payoffs, such as for crop damage insurance,
may routinely exceed the expected benefits from the adoption of preventive
measures. 169 Private insurers seek to segregate risks by charging different
rates for different risk categories and to aggregate uncorrelated risks to
reduce the insurers' own risk exposure.1 70 In contrast, public insurance
programs have historically engaged in little risk segregation, and the trigger
events for compensation are often highly correlated risks.
Experts have estimated that effective rent-seeking concerning
subsidized flood insurance charges has led to the government's charging as
little as five percent of actuarially accurate insurance rates. 17 1 Not only does
massive undercharging leave the government with massive risk exposure,
but also the moral hazards caused by these subsidies encourage property
owners to develop land in exposed areas while shifting almost all of the
risks to the federal government. 72 Past alleged market failures have led to
the creation of government insurance programs covering floods and
mudslides, 173 weather-related damage to crops,1 74 caps on the liability of
167. See GRON & SYKES, supra note 26, at 2.
168. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO-02-175T, TERRORISM INSURANCE:
ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS FOR PROTECTING INSURANCE CONSUMERS 3-6 (2001), at
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/102401rh.pdf (laying out a range of federal direct
subsidized insurance programs).
169. See Priest, supra note 11, at 224-25.
170. See Priest, supra note 29, at 1540.
171. See William L. Inden, Comment, Compensation Legislation: Private Property Rights vs.
Public Benefits, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 119, 144-45 (1996).
172. See id.
173. See, e.g., Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-234, 87 Stat. 975
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.): National Flood Insurance Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
174. See Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. § 1508 (2000).
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owners of nuclear power plants,'75 and even riot protection and inner-city
burglary and robbery insurance until 1983 and 1995, respectively. 
7 6
The government's direct subsidized insurance programs have
historically been plagued by a litany of problems of poor government risk
estimation and administration, moral hazard, adverse selection, cross-
subsidies, and unbridled rent-seeking by the narrow groups of beneficiaries
who have often captured the agency overseeing the terms of the insurance
program.' 77 This fact makes the reinsurance program and its indirect
subsidies appear to be an innovative approach the particular design of
which offers significant advantages over traditional direct government
insurance programs.
One could easily imagine why proponents of the Act might have
preferred the rent-seeking opportunities of direct government insurance.
Nonetheless, embracing a reinsurance approach allowed proponents to
distinguish the plan as a backstop rather than a direct bailout. This framing
of the issue provided political cover for their rent-seeking ends and the
politicians who supported them. 178 The claim that this reinsurance approach
preempts "a much larger, more costly and poorly designed role for the
government"' 179 that could result if nothing is done and Congress responds
in haste to another attack has some credence. As either a political
compromise or a lesser evil, the reinsurance approach and its particular
features appear to be a step forward from traditional direct subsidized
programs and offer significant advantages for limiting rent-seeking.
2. The Virtue of the Reliance on Market Pricing and an
Indirect Federal Role
The virtue of the reinsurance plan is that it shifts significant risks to the
federal government, yet minimizes the government's direct role in
insurance markets. Private insurers remain in charge of pricing insurance. It
may be efficient for the federal government to assume catastrophic
terrorism risks, which enhances the effective liquidity of insurers and their
ability to withstand catastrophic attacks. There is no reason, however, to
believe that the government would be more effective in gauging the
terrorist risk exposure of applicants for property-casualty insurance.
175. See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000).
176. See KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: THE CASE OF
INSURANCE 42 (1988).
177. See Levmore, supra note 81, at 7-9; Priest, supra note 11, at 225-35.
178. See Hearing, supra note 93.
179. Editorial, Congress Should Expand Alternatives, BUS. INS., June 3, 2002, at 8 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); id. (arguing that large-scale financial and commercial
bankruptcies following another attack could lead to a far worse solution than the reinsurance
plan).
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Notwithstanding the government's terrorist intelligence capacities,
private insurers appear much better situated than government bureaucrats to
decide how to calculate the probability of terrorist attacks and their likely
magnitude in order to determine appropriate insurance premiums. Private
insurers possess both the profit incentives and the actuarial experience to
conduct case-by-case analyses of risk exposure. Insurers will still face
significant misestimation risks, which is part of the rationale for the Act.
Nonetheless, if there is a learning curve, the reinsurance backdrop and its
implicit subsidies will give insurers sufficient space to experiment and to
refine their ability to estimate terrorism risks, and to segment the market
into categories of relative risk exposure.
Another advantage of the government's indirect role in reinsurance is
its limited nature. This approach secures the liquidity of insurers in the
event of catastrophic events. The government has not fully crowded out
private reinsurers, however, and has allowed reinsurers to address the
substantial risks insurers still face because of deductibles and copayments.
Reinsurers, such as General Electric Employers' Reinsurance Corporation,
are moving to plug the gaps by offering "deductible buy-down" coverage to
cover the risks posed by the deductible.1 80 Over time as reinsurers fill the
gap, it will make it (theoretically) easier to expand the role for the private
sector, and perhaps to create a constituency that stands to profit from this
objective.
In spite of all of the advantages of private-sector price setting, the one
illusory appeal of direct government provision is the ability for a
government agency immediately to ensure the availability of terrorism
insurance at predictable and artificially low prices. This solution would
offer short-term gain to politicians in "solving the problem" and ongoing
opportunities for beneficiaries to lobby a federal agency for lower prices.
The likely inability of regulators to withstand the pressures from politicians
and beneficiaries would make it difficult to limit the degree of subsidies and
make it much harder to minimize adverse selection problems and moral
hazards. The poor track record in this regard demonstrated by a myriad of
direct government insurance programs reinforces this point.' 81 In contrast,
subjecting pricing decisions to market discipline by vesting these decisions
in private insurers may allow subsidies to be introduced, yet limit the
potential for abuses.
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2003, at 1 (laying out how reinsurers can fill a significant gap in the government's federal
backstop program by offering supplemental reinsurance coverage for insurers' terrorism insurance
deductibles).
181. See Levmore, supra note 81, at 7-9.
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3. The Use of Deductibles and Copayments To Limit Moral Hazards
Moral hazards are virtually unavoidable in any insurance or reinsurance
policy. The Act's use of deductibles and copayments for insurers, however,
helps to mitigate the moral hazards that terrorism insurance creates.
Substantial deductibles and ten percent copayments for damages above the
deductibles provide incentives for private insurers to monitor policyholders'
use of preventive measures and to implement loss-sharing devices on
policyholders to limit moral hazards.1 82 Private insurers retain incentives to
monitor policyholders and to innovate in the use of deductibles, other loss-
sharing devices, or premium credits or surcharges for policyholders. These
devices may provide economic incentives for companies to take precautions
in building design or otherwise take steps to reduce ex ante risk exposure or
mitigate post-terrorist-attack damages.
These market incentives may ultimately help to keep terrorism
insurance premiums lower than they otherwise would be. Monitoring by
insurers and designing premiums to give policyholders incentives to
mitigate losses in the event of attacks may reduce overall risk exposure.
183
The result may be potential decreases or at least incentives for limits in
implicit government subsidies through encouraging policyholders to take
steps to reduce their risk exposure rather than face higher terrorism
insurance premiums. 
84
Additionally, provisions for limited mandatory recoupment of
government funds and the Treasury Secretary's discretion for further
recoupment theoretically introduce further incentives for insurers to reduce
moral hazards.' 85 In the event of catastrophic attacks, the President's desire
for reelection or concern for his political party's fortunes would likely
combine with political pressures from insurers to make it highly unlikely
that the Treasury Secretary would exercise her discretionary recoupment
powers. Therefore, incentives for insurers to limit moral hazards turn
largely on the use of deductibles and copayments.
Obviously, if reducing risk exposure to terrorist attacks were the sole
policy objective, then a simple exclusion of terrorism coverage would best
182. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 103(e)(1), (e)(7), 116 Stat.
2322, 2328-30 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 248, 1610, 6701 (West Supp. 2003)).
183. See Priest, supra note 11, at 224-25 (praising the often overlooked potential of
deductibles, copayments, and exclusions to reduce moral hazards).
184. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 103(e)(1), (e)(7).
185. The formula is that the Treasury Department must recoup the difference between $10
billion in 2003, $12.5 billion in 2004, or $15 billion in 2005, and the aggregate of insurers'
uncompensated losses for each year up to the amount of compensation given by the federal
government. Thereafter, the Treasury Secretary has considerable discretion on recoupment with
caps on how much of a premium she can charge each year. Id. § 103(e)(6), (e)(7).
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effect that end. 186 The hope would be, however, that the use of copayments
and deductibles under the Act-and, in turn, the use of deductibles by
insurers-could provide protection while tempering the potential moral
hazards.
In contrast, most direct government insurance provisions suffer from
severe moral hazards.1 87 This problem often occurs because of the lack of
deductibles and copayments, which rent-seeking policyholders have
fiercely contested and defeated. For two reasons, even a direct insurance
program that did employ copayments and deductibles would likely prove
less effective than a private counterpart in monitoring and designing the
proper incentives. First, the government agency would not have to
internalize its costs in the same way that private firms must to survive
because of the agency's ability to draw on other sources of government
revenues, at least in the long run. Second, a government agency providing
terrorism insurance would be far more vulnerable to agency capture. In that
context, politicians and special-interest beneficiaries could lean on
bureaucrats more readily for rent-seeking than on their private-sector
counterparts who are bound to the discipline of market pricing.
4. The Political Constraints on Attempts To Strengthen the Act
The existence of a formula of deductibles and copayments is a positive
step forward for limiting the government's exposure to moral hazards.
Nonetheless, the question remains whether politicians possess the means to
set deductibles and copayments at higher levels and thereby to reduce both
moral hazards and the degree of upward redistribution to insurers and high-
risk beneficiaries. The higher the federal government sets deductibles
and/or copayments, the greater the incentive for insurers to limit moral
hazards and the more the reinsurance program will serve primarily as a
liquidity device, rather than as a vehicle for indirect federal subsidies.
The advantage of the reinsurance plan is that the level of implicit rents
is, in theory, "locked in" by set deductible and copayment levels for the
two-to-three-year duration of the plan. 188 Obviously, Congress can amend
the plan at any time and may do so if terrorism risk perceptions change
dramatically. The need for a legislative change during the plan's initial
three-year existence, however, makes changes more costly both for raising
186. Id.; see also Kendall, supra note 23, at 569-75 (highlighting the range of terrorism
exclusions that have developed after the World Trade Center attacks, and suggesting their
potential effects on policyholders' assumptions of risk).
187. See Priest, supra note 11, at 226.
188. It is advantageous for private reinsurers to be able to respond to changing circumstances
and to adjust deductibles and copayments to reflect changing perceptions of risk. In contrast, the
lack of market incentives for bureaucrats may make it more likely for them to abuse these powers
and to become more vulnerable to capture by those they are nominally overseeing.
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or reducing deductibles and copayments. This statutory "lock-in" may help
to limit rent-seeking. In contrast, determined beneficiaries would have
greater incentives to seek to capture federal regulators if this power were
vested in a federal agency with the ability to make midstream changes in
deductible and copayment levels.
For this reason, the time to push for change will be at the three-year
expiration of the plan. 8 9 It is a truism in Washington that programs take on
a life of their own. In this case, the existence of government reinsurance
creates entrenched constituents with incentives to renew the program and to
expand their rents. 190 Therefore, there is every reason to believe that
government terrorism reinsurance is here to stay for the foreseeable future.
If terrorist attacks have taken place on any scale, or if risks continue to be
perceived as high, then even a modest goal of attempting to raise
copayments and deductibles will prove futile in the face of reelection-
seeking politicians and the array of determined rent-seekers. But if the
United States continues to be blessed by the dearth of terrorist attacks on
U.S. soil and international tensions in the Middle East subside (an
optimistic hope to say the least), then there may be a potential political
opening.
The problem is that there is no obvious political constituency that is
likely to push for higher copayments and deductibles, or rather, to push
back the rent-seeking ambitions of current beneficiaries. If present budget
deficits continue over the next three years, 19 1 then there may once again be
more of a popular political constituency for fiscal responsibility. In turn, the
existence of organized groups pursuing this end may provide reelection-
seeking politicians with incentives to challenge the degree of implicit
subsidies and moral hazards built into the Act.
The indirect nature of these subsidies, however, makes the potential
cost to taxpayers harder to see. This fact makes it more unlikely that efforts
to increase copayments and deductibles for insurers could be effectively
framed as a political issue. Budget hawks are generally fixated on direct
spending, the abuses of which may have popular political resonance, rather
than on the forgone revenue implicit in tax expenditures, the very real costs
of which are more difficult to fathom. 192 The implicit subsidies of
government reinsurance more closely resemble tax expenditures in
189. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 108.
190. See GRON & SYKES, supra note 26, at 5.
191. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush's $2.2 Trillion Budget Proposes Record Deficits, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2003, at Al (noting that the Bush Administration is estimating budget deficits of
$304 billion for 2003 and $307 billion for 2004).
192. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 39-45 (rev. 4th ed. 2002) (discussing the fact that tax expenditures and
direct spending are perceived as different, yet have the same net effects).
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imposing possible costs in the distant future. Reelection-seeking politicians
will naturally focus more on short-term concerns.
The limiting features of the Act, however, provide a foundation on
which proponents of imposing copayments and/or deductibles can hope to
build. The Act already incorporates a gradually increasing deductible
requirement that requires individual insurers to cover losses for terrorism
attacks equal to 1% of direct earned premiums in 2002, 7% in 2003, 10% in
2004, and 15% of direct earned premiums in 2005.193 The Act also
explicitly states that the reinsurance program is designed to serve as "a
transitional period for the private markets to stabilize, resume pricing of
such insurance, and build capacity to absorb any future losses."' l 4 These
facts may allow proponents of higher copayments and/or deductibles to
frame their objective of continuing to incrementally increase deductibles as
consistent with the purpose of the Act. Beneficiaries may be able to claim
that the threat is ongoing and frame the existing reinsurance levels as
inadequate. But appeals to the underlying goals of the Act may place rent-
seeking beneficiaries on the defensive by couching the debate in terms of
limiting implicit subsidies and transitioning toward a larger role for the
private sector.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current Act reflects the political reality of concentrated interests of
insurers and businesses. This group had the influence and the platform to
push for the government's assumption of much of their terrorist risk
exposure. The Act disproportionately assists the insurers and affluent
property owners who face the highest risks from terrorism, yet it contains
significant safeguards that limit the potential for rent-seeking and distorting
effects on participants' behavior. The Act's reliance on market pricing
limits rent-seeking by subjecting prices to market discipline. The use of
copayments reduces moral hazards. The employment of deductibles limits
the burden shifting to the government primarily to catastrophic terrorism
risks. These advantages do not eliminate the upward redistribution, which
would be inevitable in almost any government solution to address terrorism
risks that by nature disproportionately affect the affluent. Nonetheless, the
Act serves as a politically and economically viable solution that partly
addresses the substantive economic challenges facing terrorism insurance,
yet limits the potential for abuse and further extension of rents for the three-
year term of the plan.
193. These deductibles are termed "marketplace retention." Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
§ 103(e)(6).
194. See id. § 101(b)(2).
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The threat of terrorism is one that is likely to be with us so long as the
United States maintains its global role. If terrorist threats continue to remain
perceived as real and substantial, entities facing high terrorism risks will
have both the incentives and likely the political means to continue to secure
government rents by reducing their risk exposure. Changes two to three
years hence at the expiration of the Act's program will obviously be
contingent on the degree of perceived threats. Policymakers should work
within political constraints on continuing to increase deductibles and
copayments. This approach would reduce implicit subsidies and move the
reinsurance plan toward primarily serving as a liquidity device for
catastrophic terrorist attacks. Even in its present form, however, the Act is a
significant step forward in the design of government insurance programs. It
serves as a model of how, even in the context of overwhelming rent-seeking
pressures, policymakers can incorporate market safeguards that limit the
distorting effects of government intervention.
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